Abstract encryption and authentication is often applied in wireless sensor networks. In the LEAP framework for wireless sensor networks a
It is a weakness that, if the initial key is ever disclosed, the than the time an attacker needs to capture a node then a whole network is compromised.
LEAP network is secure.
To lower the threat of KI disclosure, we present a KI-less In the life cycle of a WSN it becomes necessary to add scheme for key predistribution. Our scheme is based on new nodes to the network. Nodes cease to operate due to random key predistribution, and proves to perform better empty batteries, electrial or mechanical failure and need in medium sized networks than previous proposals. It is replacement [12] .
resilient against node capture attacks and allows node to In LEAP, K1 is present in the hostile environment every node authentication. Attacks against overlying protocols in time new nodes are added. This increases the threat of the network are more difficult with this scheme. an attacker to retrieve KI. The impact of such disclosure
We have conducted computations to show the feasibility of is significant. With K1 in his possession, an attacker can our scheme for networks up to a size of 1000 nodes. By inderive all pairwise keys and decrypt all unicast communitroducing a key reuse system we are able to increase the cation in the network. This is not limited to communication probability of a successful link setup. We have included taking place after K1 is captured, all encrypted communia security analysis that discusses our scheme's resistance cation can be decrypted retroactively. Other keys can be against commonly known attacks. derived under certain circumstances. We have derived from our observation that protection of K1 is essential in the LEAP framework. We have identified 1 Introduction node additions as a critical phase in a WSN's life cycle. Hence, we focus on developing a replacement for the keying scheme LEAP uses in the node addition phase. Protocols designed for sensor networks have to work seWe have studied the random pairwise keys scheme (RPK) curely in hostile environments. Encrypted communication proposed by Chan et al. [3] as an alternative to the basic is therefore necessary. Sensors nodes, though, are usually LEAP algorithm. The scheme perfectly preserves the low power devices with limited memory capacity and low secrecy of the network in case of node capture as well computation power. Processors used in sensor nodes fulfil as allowing node to node authentication. But, since node the requirements for public key encryption [6], but energy relations are predetermined, RPK limits the network size consumption due to extensive calculations significantly and the number of node additions. We have reviewed Chan decreases a node's lifetime [2] . Therefore, symmetric key et al.'s scheme and developed it into a new scheme. follows: Another threat can be identified in the ability of the at-1. Predistribution. The controller generates the initial tacker to arbitrarily add nodes to the network if in poskey KI and stores it in every node. Each node u genersession of KI, influencing information retrieval based on ates its master key Kt, using KI, SO that Kt, f KI (u1).
majority votes [11] . Also, any node can be impersonated, f is a secure pseudo-random function [5] .
opening the network to Sybil attacks [4] . In this section we will present our new key establishu v V u,MAC(KLV, v u) ment protocol called asynchronous random pairwise key distribution(ARPD) that evades the limitations on network 5. Key Deletion. Node u erases all pairwise keys it hasn't addition and size in RPK while offering node to node used during step 4.
The algorithm provided above yields secure links with Kus = fKps(L,i) as the generation cluster key where r all neighbours node u shares a key with. To connect denotes how many nodes share this key (reusefactor). Natthe remaining immediate neighbours, other methods like urally, if one of the nodes storing this key is compromised, multipath reinforcement [1] have to be applied. Multipath the links of all nodes with the same key get compromised. reinforcement needs at least two neighbours to already be We have concentrated on reuse factors r of 2 and 3 for the connected to the node. network size assumed above.
Performance analysis direct neighbours X
In a random scheme like ARPD, a node can only connect with a certain probability to its neighbours. In this sec-L tion we study this probability and the limitations introduced through random keying and present a key reuse scheme to 0 extend the usability of our scheme. We study the feasability of our scheme up to a network twice in the physical neighbourhood. size of 1000 nodes. As suggested in [7] where Hwang and Kim compare keying schemes, we have examined sparse distributions of down to 10 neighbour nodes.
reuse factor 2. The probability to have x keys twice in the physical network neighbourhood can be calculated to memory in a single node. This is because a node has to store n pm') a certain amount of keys in its key ring before deployment 0 else to connect to at least two neighbours in its later deployment As one can see from Figure 1 , the probability to have more environment. The probability to connect drops as expected if the size of reuse factor 3. Similar to the calculation done above, we the network is increased.
can derive the probability to have x triples ( Figure 3 . The closer a successfully carried out attack is to the center of the circle, the taking the reuse factor r into account. Figure 2 shows the more information in the network is revealed or can even be ratio between the number of keys to be stored in a node to altered. guarantee a 99 percent connection probability and the size Outside attacks can further be broken down into three levof the network. It is particulary interesting to see that for els of severity. Message interception is at the lowest level, large network sizes this ratio is non-varying. Therefore, followed by message replay and at the highest level one can filtrate higher levels of the application running on the netidentify cluster affiliation. Our calculations indicated that work's nodes, the attacker needs to be able to either gain full key reuse can significantly improve memory consumption. control over a node or add new nodes to the network. Ag-
The security analysis introduced a security model to make gregation and agreement protocols still perform correctly the impact of different varieties of attacks comparable. We in presence of a limited number of malicious nodes. Still, split up the analysis into an analysis of inside and outside these protocols have to be adjusted to the security perforattacks. Our studies showed that the ARPD protocol is remance of the underlying keying mechanism.
silient against any kind of outside attacks. The impact of key disclosure in an inside attack is limited to keys that 5.2 Attack evaluation are used solely in communication with the captured node. Therefore, the key framework remained perfectly secure in Our scheme secures the network at link layer level node capture attack. against inside and outside attacks. In this section we therefore conduct experiments on this level and evaluate their
